Первый слайд презентации: Reforms of 1860-70s
Prepared: ali romeh Mohammad massoud
Слайд 2: Plan
1-Introduction 2-Why, then, did the regime finally take the fateful step towards emancipation 3--Emancipation of the Serfs/and Emancipation-views 4-The ‘reform party ’ 5- The process of emancipation 6-Chief Committee on Peasant Affairs 7- The Other Great Reforms 8-The Elementary School Statute of 1864 9-conclusion
Слайд 3: 1-Introduction
In 1855, Alexander II began his reign as Tsar of Russia and presided over a period of political and social reform, notably the emancipation of serfs in 1861 and the lifting of censorship. His successor Alexander III (1881–1894) pursued a policy of repression and restricted public expenditure, but continued land and labor reforms. The Government reforms imposed by Tsar Alexander II of Russia, often called the Great Reforms by historians, were a series of major social, political, legal and governmental reforms in the Russian Empire carried out in the 1860s
Слайд 4: 2-Why, then, did the regime finally take the fateful step towards emancipation
the key linchpin in fact was the débâcle of the Crimean War. That foreign fiasco led to domestic reconstruction, for it exposed the real backwardness and weakness of the old servile order and all that it connoted. The Crimean War not only exacted a high cost in lives, resources, and prestige, but also vitiated the main impediment to reform–the belief that the existing order was consonant with stability and power As a liberal Slavophile Iurii Samarin wrote in 1856: ‘We were vanquished not by the foreign armies of the Western alliances, but by our own internal weaknesses’. The same year a liberal Westernizer Boris Chicherin wrote that, without the abolition of serfdom, ‘no questions can be resolved–whether political, administrative, or social’. Even before the war had been irrevocably lost, conservatives as well as liberals had come to much the same conclusion.
Слайд 5: 3-Emancipation of the Serfs
The critical question became not whether, but how the serfs were to be emancipated. In part that ‘how’ concerned the terms of emancipation–whether they would receive land (in what quantities and at what price) and whether they would become full‑fledged citizens. These two issues became the central focus of the reform debates inside and outside the government The politics of reform were as important as the terms of emancipation, for they were fraught with long‑term implications about the relationship between state and society and, especially the status and role of old élites. how was reform to be designed and implemented, what indeed were to be the politics of reform? Was the state simply to promulgate emancipation (perhaps with the assistance of secret committees, to use the previous tsar’s methods) or was society itself somehow to be involved in this process
Слайд 7: 4-The ‘reform party ’
The ‘reform party’ was a coalition of different interests with a common objective. It was, in any event, not the mere handiwork of a reformist monarch. Although the traditional historiography inclined to personalize politics and ascribe much to the emperor himself, and although Alexander II (1855–81) acquired an official accolade as ‘Tsar‑Liberator’, he was in fact highly conservativeand a deeply ambivalent reformer. Far more important was the constellation of what W. Bruce Lincoln has called the ‘enlightened bureaucrats’, the gosudarstvenniki (state servitors) who identified more with the interests of the state than those of their own noble estate. Indispensable because of their superior education and practical experience, the enlightened bureaucrats (such as Nikolai Miliutin and Ia. S. Solovev ) played a critical role in the reform process Another influential party of reformers was to be found in the military; generals such as Mikhail Gorchakov concurred that ‘the first thing is to emancipate the serfs, because that is the evil which binds together all the things that are evil in Russia
Слайд 8: 5- process of emancipation
The process of emancipation, however, was by no means unilinear : it was only gradually, through trial and error, that the regime finally formulated the specific terms of the Emancipation Statutes in 1861 In his first year, in fact, Alexander deliberately tried to discourage the wild expectations that traditionally accompanied each new accession to the throne and often ignited a wave of rumours and peasant disorders: he replaced reputed reformers (such as the Minister of Interior, D. G. Bibikov, and the Minister of State Domains, P. D Kiselev ) with men known for their arch‑conservative opinions By 1856, however, the defeat in the Crimea was not to be denied and neither could the exigency of fundamental reform. In a famous speech to the nobility of Moscow on 30 March 1856, Alexander ostensibly endeavoured to reassure the serf‑owners, but ended his comments with a clear intimation of the imperative need for reform ‘from above ’
Rumors have spread among you of my intention to abolish serfdom. To refute any groundless gossip on so important a subject, I consider it necessary to inform you that I have no intention of doing so immediately. But, of course, you yourselves realize that the existing system of serf‑owning cannot remain unchanged. It is better to begin abolishing serfdom from above than to wait for it to begin to abolish itself from below Although Alexander may have hoped that the nobility, mindful of its traditional ‘service ethos’ would take its own initiative, nothing of the sort transpired. As the Third Section (secret police) was well aware, ‘the majority of the nobility believe that our peasant is too uncultured to comprehend civil law; that, in a state of freedom, he would be more vicious than any wild beast; that disorders, plundering, and murder are almost inevitable’. On 1 January 1857 Alexander resorted to the favorite device of his father: he appointed a secret commission with the charge of designing the reform of serfdom. The commission was, however, dominated by old‑regime officials, most of whom were adamantly opposed to reform; moderates were a distinct minority. Over the next several months the commission slowly worked out an extremely conservative reform project whereby peasants were to compensate the squire for their homestead, to receive no arable land, and to obtain freedom, but only through an extremely protracted process A major turning‑point came on 20 November 1857, when the government issued a directive to the governor‑general of Vilna that became the famous ‘ Nazimov Rescript’ The directive (which shortly afterwards was also sent to all other governors) instructed the governor to organize provincial assemblies of the nobility to discuss the terms of emancipation most suitable for their own region. However, the rescript did not give the nobles carte blanche, but set the basic parameters of reform: the landlord was to retain the land and police powers, but some provision was also to be made for peasant land purchases and self‑administration
Слайд 10: STEPS OF PROCESS
A fourth important focus of reform was the military, which had acquitted itself so badly during the Crimean War and was plainly in need of thoroughgoing reconstruction A fifth reform was the reform of city government in 1870. The main problem with the existing urban system was that it excluded important residential categories (above all, the nobility) from tax and other obligations, thereby weakening the social and fiscal basis of city government A sixth reform was censorship, which had exercised so notorious and pernicious an influence in pre‑reform Russia The seventh reform concerned the Russian Orthodox Church, which had internalized many norms, structures–and problems–of state and society
Слайд 11: 6-Chief Committee on Peasant Affairs
The underlying strategy was to shift the reform process from the pettifogging bureaucracy to society and to propel reform forward by mobilizing the support of the nobility itself. The Minister of Interior made it perfectly clear that local officials were to engineer assent: ‘[The serf‑owner] must be brought to his senses and persuaded that at this point there is no turning back, and that the nobility is obligated to execute the will of the Sovereign, who summons them to cooperate in the amelioration of peasant life’ (a euphemism for serfdom). Shortly afterwards, Alexander established the ‘Chief Committee on Peasant Affairs’ to oversee the reform process. At the same time, the government significantly relaxed censorship (the word glasnost ′ for the first time, in fact, coming into vogue). A dramatic break with the reform politics of Nicholas I, this very publicity made reform appear all the more irrevocable and inevitable. To the government’s dismay, however, virtually the entire nobility either opposed emancipation or demanded that its terms be cast to serve their own selfish interests. The Third Section reported that ‘most of the nobles are dissatisfied [with plans for emancipation]’, and explained that ‘all their grumbling derives from the fear that their income will diminish or even vanish altogether’. Resistance was especially strong in the blackearth areas, where land was valuable and nobles fiercely opposed any scheme for compulsory alienation of their property. In special cases (for example, where land was poor in quality) some nobles were more inclined to support emancipation, but only on condition that they be compensated for the person of the serf, not just the land itself
Distressed by this response, persuaded of the perils of a landless emancipation (which threatened to create a ‘rural proletariat’), the emperor was persuaded to resume ‘emancipation from above’–by the state, with only nominal participation of the nobility. By December 1858 a liberal majority had come to prevail on the Main Committee. It shared a consensus on two critical points: the peasantry must become a free rural class (with the commune replacing the squires’ police powers), and must have the right to purchase an adequate land allotment. Although the government retained the fiction of noble participation (a special ‘editorial commission’ was to rework the recommendations of provincial noble assemblies), in fact the liberal majority now proceeded to design a reform that would deprive the nobility not only of their police powers but also of a substantial portion of their land Without the police powers to coerce peasants to work their lands, without a complete monopoly on land, many nobles feared total ruin. As a ranking member of the ministry wrote, ‘the landlords fear both the government and the peasantry’. To consult and ostensibly to mollify the government invited representatives of the nobility to come to St Petersburg and express their views in August 1859 (from the non‑ blackearth provinces) and January 1860 (from the blackearth provinces). On both occasions the government encountered fierce criticism and, more shocking still, even audacious demands for political reform. Although the tsar officially rebuked such demands and protests, the Editorial Commission none the less made some gratuitous attempts to represent emancipation as an expression of the nobility’s collective will
Слайд 13: 7 -The Other Great Reforms
Although emancipation was the most explosive and significant reform, the government also undertook to carry out reforms on many of the other fundamental institutions of the realm. In part, this reformist zeal derived from the general ‘Crimean syndrome’, which had seemed to demonstrate not only the evil consequences of serfdom, but the general bankruptcy of the old administrative and social order In addition, many of the reforms derived from the consensus of liberal officials that not only serfs, but society more generally must be ‘emancipated’ from the shackles of state tutelage, that only this emancipation could liberate the vital forces of self‑development and progress The centralized state had clearly failed to ensure development; freedom thus must be accorded to society. But emancipation itself mandated some changes: abolition of serfdom had eliminated the squire’s authority (which had been virtually the only administrative and police organ in the countryside) and hence required the construction of new institutions. I n 1864 the government elected to confer primary responsibility on society itself by establishing a new organ of local self‑government, the zemstvo The reform statute provided for the creation of elected assemblies at the district and provincial level; chosen from separate curiae (peasants, townspeople, and private landowners), the assemblies bore primary responsibility for the social and cultural development of society’s infrastructure Specifically, by exercising powers of self‑taxation of the zemstvo, ‘society’ in each province was to build and maintain key elements of the infrastructure (such as roads, bridges, hospitals, schools, asylums, and prisons), to provide essential social services (public health, poor relief, and assistance during famines), and to promote industry, commerce, and agriculture.
Слайд 14: 8 -The Elementary School Statute of 1864
The Elementary School Statute of 1864 provided the legal framework for this multi‑tier system but left financing as the legal responsibility of the local community. A parallel statute sought to regulate and promote the growth of secondary schools. More complex, and political, was reform at the university level, which had been shaken by student unrest and appeared to be a hotbed of radicalism. Nonetheless, the University Statute of 1863 generally dismantled the crippling restrictions of Nicholas I’s rule and transformed the university into a self‑governing corporation, with far greater rights for its teaching staff and even some recognition of student rights. The third (and arguably most liberal) reform was the judicial statute of 1864 Russian courts had been notorious for their corruption, inefficiency, and rank injustice; indeed, so notorious were they that Nicholas had initiated reform by establishing a commission in 1850 to rebuild the court system
Слайд 15: 9-Conclusion
These Great Reforms thus affected a broad set of social, administrative, and cultural institutions. Most reflected a common set of principles– vsesoslovnost ′ (‘all‑ estateness ’, i.e. all estates were to participate), glasnost (‘publicity’, i.e. with societal participation in planning and implementing reform), and clear willingness to draw upon Western models. Moreover, most reforms aspired to shift power–and responsibility–from the state to society or particular social groups. Aware that the state lacked the capability or even financial means to modernize, the reformers endeavoured to liberate society’s own vital forces and to create structures (from the zemstvo to parish councils) where local initiative could sponsor development.
Последний слайд презентации: Reforms of 1860-70s: Question?
-Why, then, did the regime finally take the fateful step towards emancipation How was reform to be designed and implemented, what indeed were to be the politics of reform? Was the state simply to promulgate emancipation (perhaps with the assistance of secret committees, to use the previous tsar’s methods) or was society itself somehow to be involved in this process